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1.  Introduction
The  developing  countries  have  been  in crisis  since  1982.  By then,
the  combination  of deteriorating  terms  of trade,  rising  real  interest  rates
on their  external  debt  and  the  drying  up of commercial  lending  forced  them
to  pursue drastic economic adjustment policies.  Faced with  a sharp
withdrawal  of commercial  bank  funds  that was  only  partly  compensated  by
official  lending,  and  unwilling to  default, developing  countries  had  to
effect  a  positive  transfer  to  developed countries. The  crisis  required  a
sharp  adjustment:  developing  countries  would  have  to earn  foreign  exchange
by exporting  more  or save  it  by  importing  less. It is  now recognized  that
the  brunt  of adjustment fell on  absorption,  in particular  on investment.
In  most  developing  countries,  with  the  significant  exception  of Southeast
Asian  countries,  adjustment  was achieved by cutting  investment  rather  than
by  increasing saving.  Both  public  and  private investment fell.
Admittedly,  prior  to 1982  many  countries had  embarked  on overly  ambitious
investment  programs,  partly because recycled petro-dollars  were all  too
readily  available.  Yet  the  fall in  investment,  particularly  private
investment,  could  have adverse  implications  for  a sustained  recovery.
In response  to the  debt  crisis,  the  IMF  increased  its lending,  and
the  World  Bank  responded by  introducing  quick-disbursing  adjustment  loans
to help  countries  achieve both macroeconomic  equilibrium  and  an efficient
structural  adjustment.  In  many  quarters, the  crisis was viewed  as an
opportunity  to  carry  out  much  needed  microeconomic  reforms  that  would  raise
efficiency  and  allow  adjustment to  take place without a loss  in growth
despite  the  loss  in investment.2
Whatever  the  differences in  the  depth  of  the  crises  affectinp
them,  most developing  countries have  been  undergoing  structural  adjustment
for  almost  a  decade  now.  What  can  be  said  overall  about  the  success  of
adjustment  since  the  crisis?  In  this paper, we  evaluate  adjustment
packages  by focusing  on two  key  issues:  did  the  sharp  devaluation  of the
real  exchange  rate  (advocated  by  international  organizations)  generate  a
supply  response,  and  did  microeconomic  rationalization  sufficiently  raise
the  marginal  efficiency  of investment  to compensate  for  the  adverse  effects
of adjustment  on the  volume  of investment?  In  other  words,  are  there  signs
that  the structural  reforms  are  bearing  fruit  at least  in  the  form  of  more
efficient, if  not  higher growth, and,  if  there  is  recovery, is it
sustainable?
Sustainability  has  assumed  particular  importance  because  the  sharp
drop  in living  standards  that has  accompanied  adjustment  programs  in  many
countries  has  created  tensions that affect investment  decisions. Is the
uncertainty  preventing  investment  in  countries  that  would  otherwise  attract
investment  precisely  because  of the  lower real wages?  If credibility  is
indeed  low,  that  is,  if  investors are  waiting to see  whether  economic
conditions  will deteriorate,  then  their expectations  could  become  self-
fulfilling,  and  could  lead to  the  abandonment  of othe-wise  well-conceived
adjustment  packages.
To set  the  tone  for  our  analysis  of these  issues,  we need first  to
get  a general  sense  of  how  adjusting countries are  doing. Just as the
severity  of the  crises differed widely  across countries,  so too  has the
burden  of adjustment and  its  timing, and  no  classification  system  for
grouping  countries  can fully capture this  diversitv. Table  1 summarizes
the latest  available  figures.  !lere  we  chose  a country  grouping  based  onTable  1. MACROECONOMIC  INDICATORS  FOR  THREE  COUNTRY  GROUPINGS:




GDP  growth  Investment/GDP  Real  exchange  rate  /  in  parentheses)
Period  1978-81  1982-8t  1986-88  1978-81 1982-85  1986-88  1978-81 1982-85  1986-88  1978-81 1982-86  1986-88
Primary  oxporters  ?J  2.8  1.4  2.4  21.4  18.4  17.2  1.03  1.13  1.39  .36  .63  .61
(16)  (20)  (29)
Manufacturing  exporters  3/ 4.8  2.4  4.9  28.2  23.5  21.8  1.03  1.12  1.39  .21  .36  .40
(26)  (28)  (29)
Fuel  exporters  g  8.8  2.0  0.9  27.9  24.9  19.4  1.0  0.95  1.36  .34  *4i  .63
(18)  (25)  (39)
Notes: All  data  are  unweighted  period  avorages.
Sample  of  83  countries  with  population  exceeding  1  million  in  1980. Classifications  are  described  in  appendix.
V' The  rel exchange  rate  index  is  the  ra  ob  (expressed  in  common  currency  units)  of  a weighted  sum  of  trading  partners'  WPI
indexes  over  the  domestic  CPI index  1980 =  80  (See appendix).
!/  Residual  grouping  (45  countries).
t  Countries  with  a shar,  of  manufacturing  exports  in  total  exports  >  30%  or  a  share  of  manufacturing  in  GDP  )  13% (23
countries).
i/  Countries  with  a  share  of  fuel  exports  in  tota!  exports  >  60%  (16  countries).4
economic  structure:  fuel exporters, manufacturing  exporters,  and,  as  a
residual  category,  non-fuel  primary exporters.  Period  averag  are  taken
for  four  macro-indicators:  GDP  growth,  the  share  of investment  in GDP,  the
real  exchange  rate,  and  two  debt-burden  indicators  (the  debt-to-GDP  ratio
and  the  debt-service  ratio).
Three  facts  stand  out.  One  is  that  only  marufacturing  exporters
have resumed  growth  at pre-crisis  levels  (mostly  the  East  Asian  countries).
Although  the  debt-service  burden  of this  grou-  is  high (partly  because  of a
few  Latin  American  countries  in the  grouping),  it  has stabilized.l/  Growth
among  the fuel exporters has  deteriorated  throughout  the  three  periods.
Primary  exporters  have recuperated  most  of  their  loss  in growth,  but  they
have  not  arrested  a declining  trend  in their  external  debt indicators.
The second significant  fact  is  the  ur.iversal,  and  pronounced,
decline  in the  investment  share  in  GDP.  For  the  non-fuel  groups,  the  share
has fallen  by about  202, while  for  fuel exporters  the  decline  was even
sharper,  reaching  30?.  To  be  sure,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  overly
ambitious  investment  programs  following the  oil  boom  needed  to  be scaled
down.  But  the  declines for  the  primary  and  manufacturing  exporters  are
very  high and  may  cause  concern  about  the  prospects  for  sustained  recovery.
The finding  of a declining investment share  in GDP  and  a slowing
down  of the  rate  of growth in  spite of a sharp  deterioration  in the  real
exchange  rate  is  even more  pronounced if  we  divide our  sample  of 83
countries  into  currently  (i.e., in  1988)  severely  indebted  countries  and
others. In doing  so,  we find  that  the  36 severely  indebted  countries  had  a
decline  in  average  growth  from  3.1  percent in  1978-81  to 2.5  percent  in
1986-88  while  the  average  share  of investment  in  GDP fell  from  22.3  percent5
ln  1978-81  to 15.7  percent  in 1986-88. For  this  severely  indebted  group  of
countries,  the  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  was 46  percent.
The  third  significant  finding from Table  1  is  the  sharp  real
exchange  rate  depreciation.  Six  years  into  the  crisis,  the  real  exchange
had  depreciated  by  close  to  40  percent,  for  all  three country
classifications.  The  sharp  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  would  have  been
required  by  any  adjustment program involving an  increase in  the  net
transfer  from  debtor  to  creditor.  Otherwise the required  shift  towards
tradable  activities  would  not  have  materialized.
But  there  is  more behind this  sharp  and  universal  depreciation  in
the real  exchange  rate. When the  IMF  and  World  Bank stepped  in to fill  at
least  some  of  the  financing gap  left by  the withdrawal  of commercial
lending,  they  offered  'adjustment  with  growth"  packages  that  relied  heavily
on a sharp depreciation  of  the  real  -xchange rate as a condition  for
obtaining  funds.  Of  course, the  real exchange rate is an endogenous
variable  that  can  never  be fully under  a  country's  policy  control,  but  it
is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that achieving a  sharp real  exchange  rate
depreciation  was the  centerpiece  of these  adjustment  packages.  2/
The  failure of  such a  large number of  countries to resume
sustainable  growth in  spite of  obvious efforts to  adjust has  given
ammunition  to the  advocates of  debt  relief and  to  the  critics  of the
adjustment  with growth  packages  advocated by  the  IMF  and  the  World  Bank.
The  heavy  emphasis  on real  exchange rate depreciation  as a  way to restore
external  balance  and  elicit  a  significant  supply  response  has  been at the
centre  of this  controversy  about  the  effectiveness  of these  adjustment  with
growth  packages. In the  first  part  of  the  paper,  we take  a fresh  look  at
the  role  of the  exchange  rate  in  the  context  of adjustment  by introducing  a6
crucial  distinction  between  the  short-run supply  effect  of a real  exchange
rate  depreciation  (often  found  to  be  positive)  and  its  long-run  effect  on
growth  in  oitput  through  its  impact  on investment.
In addition  to the  emphasis on  a  sharp  depreciation  of the  real
exchange  rate,  most  adjustment  packages introduced  a host  of productivity-
enhancing microeconomic reforms.  Typically the  reforms incluaed a
rationalization  of  public  sector recurrent and  investment  expenditures;  a
restructuring  of public  enterprises;  and  trade,  fiscal,  and  credit  policy
reforms  to provide  more  nearly neutral and  transparent  incentives.  While
it is  too  early  to  see  the  full effects that are  expected  from  these
microeconomic  reforms,  one  could  hope to  detect  some  effects  in the  form  of
a greater  efficiency  of investment.  In  the  second  part  of the  paper,  we
analyze  the  behaviour  of  investment  during  adjustment,  looking  first  into
the  efficiency  and  cost of  investment.  Can  one  attribute  most of the
decline  in private  investment  to the  rising  cost  of capital  goods,  and  did
the  efficiency  of investment improve during adjustment?  Second,  because
investment  decisions  are  at least partially  irreversible,  we look  into  the
influence  of the  macroeconomic  environment,  particularly  the  debt  overhang,
on investment  decisions.
In  what follows,  we  address the  evidence for  a large  sample  of
developing  countries. In  Section 2  we  state  succinctly  the  controversy
surrounding  the  role of  the  real exchange rate  in  achieving  external
balance  and  restoring  growth.  Section 3  gives  evidence  on adjustment  in
the  external  balance  and  the  suppl-side  effects  a of real  depreciation.
Section  4 looks  at the  effects  on investment  of real  depreciation  and  other
factors.  Conclusions and  implications  for  a  sustained recovery  are
discussed  in section  5.7
2. The  Controversy
A standard framework for  analyzing the  effects of adjustment
programs  is the  two-sector  dependent economy  model  with exogenous  terms  of
trade. Consider  the  situation  prevailing before  the  crisis. Before  1981,
many countries  could  run  a  trade deficit  and  resolve  the  resulting  excess
demand  for  foreign exchange through external borrowing.  When foreign
borrowing  was foreclosed  or,  at the  least,  greatly  reduced,  the  absorption-
income  gap  had  to be reduced  to  reduce  the  current  account  deficit. (Many
countries  had  to produce  a surplus  in  their  non-interest  current  account  to
service  the increased  payments  on their  external  debt  caused  by  higher  real
interest  rates  on commercial  debt.)
When  resources are  initially fully and  efficiently  employed,
closing  the  absorption-income  gap  by  reducing  absorption  is often  referred
to as the  primary  cost,  or  inevitable  cost,  of reducing  a current  account
deficit. If closing the  gap  also entails a  reduction  in resource  use
because  of relative  price  (or  other) rigidities,  there  is  also  a secondary
cost  of adjustment.  Over  the  medium term,  adjustment  policies  to reduce
the  external  deficit  would  include  both  expenditure-reducing  and
expenditure-switching  policies  (e.g., a  real  exchange  rate  depreciation).
In  addition, if  the  adjustment package is  introduced at  a  time  of
inflation, a  cutback in  demand is  desirable to  reduce inflationary
pressures. When resources  are  not  fully  or not  efficiently  employed,  one
can  also  expect  a supply  response to  a  depreciation  of the  real  exchange
rate.
The  relative  effectiveness  of  expe.iditure-reducing  and
expenditure-switching  policies depends on  the marginal propensity to8
consume  tradables  and  on  supply responsiveness.  The lower  the  marginal
propensity  to consume tradables, the  less the  adjustment that  will  be
obtained  from  a given  demand'  reduction.  And  the  more difficult  it is  to
shift  existing resources from non-tradable to  traduule  activities,  the
greater  the  required  relative  price  shift  (i.e.,  the  greater  will  have  to
be the  real  exchange  rate  depreciation).
To  give some  idea  of  the  scope  for  substitution  in  demand,  note
that  many countries,  especially primary exporters,  do  not  consume  exports
domestically.  Also,  clcse  substitutes  for  imports are  typically  not
available  in the  short  to  medium run.  Data  for  a group  of 40  develoring
countries  indicates  that  the  share of  consumer  good  imports  fell  from  30Z
in 1980  to 25Z  in 1987.  Such a  shift  toward  the inelastic  component  of
total  imports is  likely to  reduce the  effectiveness  of expenditure-
switching  policies.
The  traditional  structuralist  argument  against  devaluation  is that
it  has  a small  impact on  the  trade balance  because  of low  elasticities.
This  traditional  argument  has  been  buttressed by the  contention  that  the
redistributive  mechanisms  brought  into  play  by devaluation  (i.e.,  the  shift
from  low  savers  to  high  savers) are  contractionary  from  the  demand  side
(Krugman  and  Taylor,  1977).  aditional  stabilization  packages  reach  the
point  of "overkill"  (Diaz-Alejandro  1980, Dell  1982) when it is further
recognized  that  restrictive  monetary policy may  have  a contractionary
effect  on supply  through  higher  interest  costs  (Cavallo  1977,  Bruno  1979).
These  shortcomings  did  not  go  unnoticed  within  the  international
agencies. But  it  was  not  until  the  advent  of adjustment  lending  in the
early  eighties  ($26  billion  from  the  IMF  and  $16  billion  from  the  World
Bank  during 1980-87) that  these agencies made  an  explicit  attempt  to9
combine  short-run  stabilization  goals with  growth-oriented  policies. In
this  new framework  (see Corbo  et  al.,  1987, and  Thomas  et al., 1990),
devaluation  of the  real  exchange rate still  played  an essential  role,  not
only  to restore external balance but  also  to  achieve  a  more efficient
resource  allocation.  From  the  perspective  of  this new  framework,  the
advocates  of  adjustment  with  growth believed that the  positive  supply
response to  a  real devaluation  would  be  sufficient to  dominate  its
contractionary  effects.
This  new  emphasis on  growth did  not  diminish the  criticism,
however. A "new"  structuralist  critique  pointed  out  that  devaluation  could
be contractionary,  this  time  from  the  supply side. The  effect  would  come
through  the  higher  cost  of imported  inputs  (Buffie  1984),  a lower  volume  of
real  credit  (because  of  higher  input prices  with constant  nominal  credit)
and  consequently  higher interest costs  for  firms  (Van  Wijnbergen  1986),
and, in the  presence of  widespread wage indexation,  through  higher  labor
costs. Finally,  in  the  longer  run, the  negative  effect  on supply  could  be
compounded  if a real  depreciation  depressed  investment  because  of a higher
cost  of imported  capital  equipm.ent  (Buffie  1986).
As  an  example,  consider  the  following back-of-the-envelope
calculation  of the  contractionary  effects of a devaluation  that  increases
the  costs  of intermediate  inputs.  For  the  countries  in  Table  1, the  real
exchange  rate  depreciated  by  approximately  25?  between 1980  and  1987.
Assuming  an economy-wide  value-added ratio of 0.5,  imported  intermediates
at 302  of total  intermediates,  and  long-run  demand  and  supply  elasticities
of 1 and  2 respectively,  the  contractionary  effect  would  be 5Z  of GDP.  (In
addition,  the  contractionary  effects  from  the  demand  sile  could  conceivably
lead  to excess  supply  among  non-traded  sectors.)  3/10
It should  be understood that  this  "new"  critique  assumes  that  a
nominal  devaluation  results  in  a real devaluation  on impact  --  as has  been
the  case  in the  eighties. The  amount  of the  real  devaluation  will probably
be less  than  the  nominal devaluation,  but  it  will  be substantial,  as the
figures  in  table  1 show.  Over  the  longer  term,  as various  studies  have
pointed  out  (e.g. Edwards 1989a), there  is  a  tendency for  the  real
aevaluation  to erode  because of  wage  indexation  and  other  factors. The
critique  remains  worthy  of  closer investigation,  however,  in  view  of the
pronounced  depreciation  in  the  real  exchange  rate  apparent  from  table  1  and
the  difficulties  many  countries  have  had  in resuming  growth.
Finally,  a related  critique  from the  advocates  of debt  relief  is
that  the  resulting overkill from the  extreme severity of adjustment
programs  combined  with a deteriorating  external  debt  position  has inhibited
private  investment.  According to  these critics, the  debt  overhang  has
acted  as a tax  on the  proceeds  of investment  (Sachs,  1989)  and  uncertainty
has  created  negative  incentives for  private investment  (Rodrik  1989,  and
Dornbusch  1988). As  pointed out  earlier, the  criticism  rests  upon  the
consequences  of  uncertainty  on the  decision to invest  in  a  world  where  the
investment  decision  is  at least  partly irreversible.  The  argument  here is
that  uncertainty  about  the  future  course  of an adjustment  package  will lead
potential  investors  to  adopt a  wait  and  see  attitude even  if crucial
indicators  for  a decision  to invest, like real  wages,  are favourable.  In
the  typical  Latin  American  case,  flight  capital  will  not  be repatriated  for
investment  because  uncertainty  about  the  outcome  of the  ongoing  adjustment
package  is  high.11
3.  External  Adjustment  and  the  Real  Exchange  Rate
We have  seen  that  developing countries  responded  to  the shocks  of
the  1980s  by depreciating  their  real exchange rate.  4/  How  effective  has
real  exchange  rate  depreciation  been?  First we analyze  the  evolution  of
the  trade  balance  to see  how  much  of the  improvement  in the  trade  balance
was accounted  for  by real  exchange  rate  depreciation  after  controlling  for
time  trends  and  country  specific  effects.  Second,  we look  for  evidence  of
supply  response  to the  real  exchange  rate.
Start  with the  trade  balance.  For  each  one  of the  three  country
groupings  in table  1,  we  pool  countries and  correlate  the  trade  balance-
to-GDP  ratio  with absorption,  the  real  exchange  rate,  country  dummies  and  a
time  trend. Unfortunately,  because of  lack of  data, we are  unable  to
sepa.ate  out  directly  the  effect of  demand  switching  and supply  response.
Results  are reported  in Table 2.  All  coefficients  for  the  real  exchange
rate  are  significant  with the  exception of that  for  fuel-exporters,  which
is  not  surprising since natural-resource-based  economies usually  have
price-insensitive  supply  structures.  Generally the  lagged  value  of the
real  exchange  rate  is insignificant.  The  coefficient  on absorption  is  even
more significant.  For  our sample, then  we conclude  that  the  real  exchange
rate  depreciation  contributed  to improving  the  trade  balance.
We also  reestimated  the  same equation  adding  dummy  variables  for
the  post-1981  period  on the  coefficients  of  A  and  RER.  For  the  primary-
exporter  group  a  significantly  negative value  showed up  for  the  real
exchange  rate  dummy  variable, suggesting  no contribution  of real  exchange
rate  depreciation  to trade balance improvements.  5/  This  is  consistent
with  other  studies  which  have attempted to link  the  trade  balance  with the
real  exchange  rate.  6/12
Table  2.  Determinants  of the  Trade  Balance
(Dependent  variable: (TB/GDP)t)
Manufacturing  Fuel  Primary
Exporters  Exporters  Exporters
ln  At  -0.16  -0.78  -0.49
(.066)  (.764)  (.123)
ln RERt  0.18  0.10  0.20
(.076)  (.109)  (.836)
ln RERt-l  0.07  0.15  0.08
(.065)  (.117)  (.090)
NOBSa  390  230  355
(20)  (11)  (18)
a/  Number  of  countries  in  parenthesis.  Maximum time  span  is  20 years
(1965-85).  Countries with  less than  40  observations  excluded  t-
statistics  in  parenthesis.
Notes: Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  Estimation  method: Instrumental
variables  (IV). Instruments:  real  money  supply  and  lagged  values
of absorption  and  real  exchange rate.  Time  trend  and  country
intercepts  omitted.
(TB/GDP)t  =  trade  balance  over  GDP.
At  =  real  absorption.
RERt  =  real  exchange  rate (defined  as in table  1).
Country  intercepts  not  reported.13
It is interesting  to  measure the  relative  contribution  of changes
in absorption  and  of the  real exchange rate on  the  trade  balance. The
index  R =  a2/al (elasticity  of  the  trade balance with respect  to  price/
elasticity  of the  trade balance with  respect  to  absorption)  measures  the
relative  impact  on the  trade  balance  of  a reduction  in absorption  and  of a
real  depreciation.  For  our  three  country  groupings,  this  index  is 1.13  for
manufacturing  exports, 0.13  for  fuel exporters, and  0.41  for  primary
exporters. The  exchange rate contributes to trade  balance  improvements
mostly  for  manufacturing  exporters.  This  is  exactly what  the "old"
structuralists  would  argue.  For  the  rest of  the  developing  world,  the
relative effectiveness  of  expenditure  switching policies is  very low
indeed. Falling  in this  category  are small  low-income  countries,  which are
at  a  relatively early stage of  industrialization  with  a  small and
undiversified  industrial  sector.  These  countries  have few  opportunities
for  expanding  exports,  which  are  concentrated  in  a few  primary  commodities.
The scope  for  export  expansion  is  typically  even  more limited  for  natural-
resource-based  economies  such  as fuel  exporters,  although  there  may be room
for  adjustment  on the  import  side  if  they  have  a larger  share  of consumer
imports. These  are  the  prototypical  "structuralist"  economies  (see  Chenery
1975,  Taylor  1982).
One  can  also  use  the  estimates  in  table  2 to see  how  much  of the
improvement  in  trade balance was  accounted for  by  real  exchange  rate
depreciation  after  controlling  for  country-specific  effects  and  the  time
trend. For  manufacturing  exporters  (primary  exporters),  the  average  trade-
balance-to-GDP  ratio  was 4.9  (2.3)  percentage  points  higher  in 1983-85  than
in  1979-81.  For  manufacturing  exporters, real  exchange  depreciation
accounted  for  a 2.1  percentage  point  improvement  in  the  trade  balance  while14
for  primary  exporters  real  exchange rate  depreciation  only  contributed  for
0.8  percentage  point  improvement.
The limited  scope  for  import substitution  is also  apparent  from
the  evolution  of the  composition  of  non-fuel  imports  during  the  1980s.  The
data (not  shown  here)  indicates some  import  substitution  in consumer  goods
with a rising  share  of intermediate  goods  in  imports. But since  the  share
of consumer goods  in  total  imports was  already low  at  the  onset  of
adjustment  (about  202),  it is  likely that  little  supply  response  could  be
expected from the  replacement  of  imports with  domestically  produced
substitutes  for  the  majority  of developing  countries.
Turn  now to supply  response. We assume  that  output  supply  at each
point  of time  is  a  function of  the  capital stock,  the  cost  of variable
inputs,  and  possibly  of lagged supply.  Because of lack  of data  for  our
large  sample,  we  approximate  the  cost  of  variable inputs by the  real
exchange  rate. This  variable  is  also  intended  to  proxy  the  costs  of labor
and,  more importantly,  the  presumed  supply-augmenting  effects  of adjustment
programs  based  on  real exchange rate depreciation.  As before,  dummy
variables  capture  country  specific effects. The  country-classification  is
unchanged. After  taking  a  quasi  first  difference  of the  supply  equation,
one  obtains  the  reduced  form  of table  3.
Interestingly,  when  it  comes to  the  coefficient on  the  real
exchange rate,  one  finds  consistently  a  negative and  significant
contribution  to supply  (the  lagged  effects  appear  insignificant).  It  must,
of  course,  be recognized  that  our  simple  reduced-form  is  certainly  a short-
cut  way  of  trying to  capture the  supply-enhancing  effects of a real
depreciation.  In terms  of the  framework  developed  earlier,  the  results  in
table  3, suggest that  the  presumed resource  switching  towards  tradables15
Table  3.  The  Impact  of the  Real  Exchange  Rate  on Supply
(Dependent  variable: ln Yt.)
Fuel  Primary  Manufacturing
Exporters  Exporters  Exporters
ln Yt-,  0.439  0.313  0.207
(0.151)  (0.065)  (0.113)
ln Yt-2  -0.042  0.073  0.127
(0.069)  (0.030)  (0.053)
ln RERt  -0.098  -0.168  -0.083
(0.036)  (0.061)  (0.032)
ln  RERt_l  0.069  0.152  -0.006
(0.077)  (0.061)  (0.054)
in It  0.120  0.105  0.157
(0.026)  (0.009)  (0.015)
Wald  Test  477.6  853.8  81.8
(5)+  (5)+  (5)+
Sargan  Test  5.44  4.56  0.91
(5)+  (5)+  (5)+
Test for  2nd  order
serial  correlation
N(0,1)  -0.813  0.839  -0.345
Maximum  time-span  is  20  years  (1965-85).  Countries with  less  than  4
observations  excluded.
Notes: Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  Estimation  method. Instrumental
variables. Instruments:  world  demand, real  money  supply,  real
GDP,  and  real  investment.  The  Wald  test measures joint
significance.  The  Sargan test measures the  accuracy of the
instrument  set.  First-order  serial ^orrelation  is introduced  by
taking  first-differences  in  the  original  equation.
Variables: Y:  real  GDP
RER:  real  exchange  rate (as  defined  in table  1)
I:  real  gross  fixed  investment
+:  degrees of freedom16
elicited  by the  massive  real  exchange  rate  depreciation  involved  at least  a
temporary  output  loss.  In  a  world  where  factor specificity  plays  an
important  role,  switchit.g  policies  woula  be expected  to lead  some  resource
idleness. It  may  well  be  that non-tradable  activities  used  factors  not
easily  transferable  to  tradable activities.  Probably  the  real  exchange
rate  variable  also  captures  other adjustment  effects  associated  with  terms
of trade  loss  like  lack  of  foreign  exchange. Nonetheless,  taken  together,
the  results  in tables  2 and  3 give  support,  though  perhaps  only  suggestive,
to the  concerns  raised  by the  structuralist  critique.
4.  Investment,  the  Real  Exchange  Rate,  and  the  Debt  Overhang
The  sharp  fall  in  the  share of  investment  in  GDP  in  developing
countries  (Table  1)  does  not  bode well  for  a consolidation  of adjustment
achievements  to  date  in  the  absence of  a  significant increase  in  the
efficiency  of investment.  7/  Lower  investment  not only  reduces  future
productive  capacity, it  also engenders lowered expectations  for  future
growth. These  expectations  may  be  socially  destabilizing.  In  addition,
lower  investment  limits  the  scope  for  resource  reallocation  in  response  to
reforms  throughout  the  economy. Yet  it is resource  reallocation  to the  new
set  of incentives  created  by the  reforms  that  is  expected  to  play  a crucial
role  in  most  adjustment-with-growth  programs.
The  disappointing  investment  rate  in  developing  countries  may be
attributable  to the  extreme economic and  financial distress  of the  most
recent  period,  or  it may  be  attributable to  the  design  of adjustment
policies. Two  components of  the  adjustment-with-growth  programs  may  have
been responsible  for  the  investment  slump.  The  first  has to do  with the17
effects  of a real  depreciation;  the  second  with the  microeconomic  .eforms
that  were part  of the  condltionality  provisions  of the  adjustment  packages
supported  by  the  World  Bank.  Consider again  the  impact of  a real
depreciation.  It  has  been  argued  (e.g., Blejer  and  Khan  1984),  that  the
availability  of foreign  exchange  exerts a  powerful  influence  on investment
both  because  it is  needed  to purchase  mostly  foreign-produced  capital  goods
and  because  it  may  permit a  less restrictive  monetary policy. A real
exchange  rate  depreciation  is  expected to  promote  investment  by increasing
the  availability  of foreign  exchange.  This  may  not  happen,  however,  since
a real  exchange  rate  devaluation  may  substantially  raise  the  real  cost  of
capital  goods  (Buffie  1984).
The second  way in  which  adjustment  programs  may  have  contributed
to the  slump  in  investment  comes  from the  cut  in  public  expenditures
required  by IMF  stabilization  programs and  by  the  strong  public  sector
management  reform  component  in World  Bank  structural  adjustment  programs.
Structural  adjustment programs aimed  at  restoring growth not  only  by
rationalizing  fiscal  and  financial incentives  through  economy-wide  market
and  financial sector reforms, but  also  by  strengthening  public  sector
management.  Many structural  adjustment packages  required  a combination  of
divestiture  of some  public  enterprises  and  a freeze  on the  creation  of new
ones  and  on  employment levels in  existing ones  --  in other  words,  a
reduction  in  public  sector's  expenditure.  It  was  hoped  that  private  sector
investment  would  move in to replace  public  sector  investment  and  that,  as a
result of  the  policies aimed  at  rationalizing  price  incentives and
reforming  public sector management, the  overall marginal  efficiency  of
investment  would  rise.18
ro  evaluate  the  proximate causes of  the  fall  in the  investment
share  in  GDP,  we collected  time-series  data  on public  sector  investment  for
a sample  of  32  countries.  The  data can  be  used  to  provide  a rough
breakdown  of total  investment  by public  and  private  sector  components.  The
remainder  of the  paper  is  based  on analysis  of these  data.
4.1  Efficiency  of Investment  and  Cost  of Investment
The  longer  term  trends  (1970-86)  of public  and  private  investment
rates  are  displayed  by subperiod  for  the  manufacturing  and  primary  exporter
groups  in table  4.  Comparable trends for  the  G-7  countries  are  also
provided  as a reference. Broadly similar  trends  apply  to developed  and  to
developing  countries.  For  all  country groupings, private and  public
investment  falls  in  the  post-1982 period, and  the  cost-of-capital  index
rises. Fluctuations,  however,  are  more  pronounced  for  developing  than  for
developed  countries.
For  developing  countries,  four  stylized  facts  emerge. First  is  an
increase  in the  share  of  public investment during the  period  of "easyr
credit,  when  there was  ample  liquidity in  the  world  capital  markets
following  the  first  oil  price  rise.  Second is  a sharp  downward  shift  in
the  share  of private investment in  GDP  after  the  crisis,  especially  for
primary  exporters. Third  is  a steady increase  in  the  real  cost  of capital
along  with a rise  in  the  relative price  of investment  goods. Fourth  is  a
sharp  swing  in the  ICOR for  manufacturing  exporters,  with an improvement
during  1983-86,  whereas  the  ICOR  for  primary  exporters  remains  stable.
On the  basis  of  these broad  trends, one would  be tempted  to
conclude  that  adjustment programs were  largely successful,  at least  for
manufacturing exporters.  For  this  group, the  fall  in  public andTable  4:  EFFICIENCY  OF INVESTMENT  AND  COST  OF INVESTMENT,  1970-86
(unweighted  period  avorages)
Poriod  Private /  Public  */  Total  */  Ind.  Deflator  (q)  Private  Total  Cost  of
Average  Investment  Investment  Investment  CDP  Deflator  (p)  ICOR  b/  ICOR b/  Capital  Index  c/
Manufacturing  Exporters  d/
1970-74  12.8  6.2  19.0  1.00  1.08  1.64  54
1976-82  14.7  7.9  22.8  1.01  2.14  3.41  100
1983-88  12.3  6.6  18.8  1.03  1.86  2.67  233
Primary Exporters  d/
1970-74  14.6  5.6  20.2  .98  1.29  1.80  38
1976-82  14.7  7.3  22.0  1.05  1.51  2.32  100
1983-88  10.9  8.0  17.0  1.07  1.50  2.31  158
Developed  Countries  e/
'4  1970-74  20.7  4.1  24.9  .98  2.07  2.60  76
197E-82  19.0  3.7  22.7  1.00  2.20  2.63  100
1983-86  18.6  3.1  21.6  1.00  1.91  2.23  162
Note:  6 =  depreciation  rate  (6  =  0.07);
IP  =  real  private  investment;
q(p)  =  investment  (GDP)  deflator;
CDP  real  GDP;
i  = nominal  interest  rate.
!i  Ratios  to  GDP  expressed  in  real  terms.
h  IC(t)  =  IP(t)/(GDP(t)-(1-6)  GDP(t-1)).
r  =  (i  6  - q)  (q/p).
J  See  appendix  for  definition  of  country  groupings.
J  Data  for  US,  UK,  France,  Germany,  Japan,  Italy,  Canada.  Government  bond  yield  taken  as proxy  for interest  rate.20
private  sector  investment  was  accompanied  by an increase  in the  efficiency
of total  investment.  It  could also be  argued  that  the  reduction  in the
size  of  the  public sector's capital expenditures  weeded  out  the  most
inefficient  investments  and  that  the  rationalization  of  public  sector
investments  raised  the  marginal  efficiency  of  public  investment.
However, by  emphasizing the  need  for  a  real exchange rate
depreciation,  adjustment  programs  compounded the  increase in  the  cost  of
capital. It  was  hoped  that  the higher  cost  of capital  would  increase  the
efficiency  use  of  capital.  And, helped by  financial  sector  reforms,
distortions in  factor  prices  favouring capital-intensive  production
techniques  would  be elimina'ed. In  the  final  analysis,  this  means  that  the
same  growth  rates  can  now  be  achieved with  a smaller  investment  effort  if
the  efficiency-augmenting  effects  are  sufficiently  strong.
These  findings  and  interpretations  are  at  best  suggestive,  but
certainly  not  conclusive.  The  fall  in  the  ICOR  may reflect  a  higher  rate
of capacity  utilization  of a  slowly  increasing  (or  perhaps  even  shrinking)
volume  of capacity. It  may  also  reflect a cutback  of projects  with long
gestation  lags (particularly  public investment projects).  In both  cases
the  decline  in  the  ICOR may  not  be  sustainable  and  is  likely  to  be
reversed. Better  information (like a  breakdown of  GDP into  public  and
private  sector  components)  would  be  needed for  a sounder  verdict.  8/  We
can,  however,  go a  bit  further and  verify  whether  the real  exchange  rate
depreciation  was a cause  of  the  increase in the  real  cost  of investment.
We can  also verify whether the  major  cause  of  the  decline  in  private21
investment  was the  increase  in  the  cost  of investment  or other  factors  such
as depressed  demand.
We start with  the  cost  of  capital goods.  Table  5  displays
estimates  of the  elasticity  of the  relative  price  of capital  goods  in  terms
of the  real  exchange  rate.  The  results show that  a real  exchange  rate
devaluation  significantly  increases  the  relative price  of investment.  The
effect  is stronger  for  manufacturing  exporters  than  for  primary  exporters.
At first  sight  this appears paradoxical.  However, the result  is less
surprising  when  we  consider that  the  share of  construction in total
investment is  usually higher in  lower-income  countries (see  Chenery,
Syrquin,  and  Robinson  1986). In sum,  the  results  in  tables  4 and  5 suggest
that  our  data  are  at  least  consistent  with  the  "new"  structuralist
critique,  namely,  that  depreciation  of  the  real exchange  rate  will have
some  contractionary  effects  on  supply in  the medium  to  long  term.  Of
course,  the  undesirable  effects of  these  contractionary  pressures  must be
balanced against any  efficiency-enhancing  effects resulting from  less
distortion  in  the  cost  of  capital.
We turn  next  to the  causes of the  decline  in  private  investment.
A contributing  factor  must  have  been  the  income  loss  that  resulted  from  the
combination  of  worsening  terms of  trade  and  higher  debt-service  payments.
For  the  same  group  of countries as  those in table  1,  Faini  et al. (1990)
estimate  a loss  in income  of 2.5  percent  of the  average  GDP  between  1978-81
and  1982-86  (period  averages). To  sort  out  further  the  effects  on  private
investment  of demand  side  shocks  and  of  the  cost  of  capital,  we estimate  a
standard  accelerator  model  in which  the  growth of  absorption  and  the
expected  cost  of capital are  the  main  determinants  of investment  demand.
The  simplicity  of the  accelerator  model  makes  it  attractive  for  separating22
Table  5:  The  Real  Exchange  Rate  and  the  Relative  Price
of Investment  Goods
(dependent  variable  ln (q/p)
Manufacturing  Primary
exporters  exporters
ln  RER  0.46  0.20
(0.07)  (0.07)
Wald test (X 2)  99.2  147.9
(15)+  (9)+
Notes: Data  and  country classification are  the  same as  table  4.
Estimation  method: instrumental  variables.  Instruments: lagged
RER,  country intercepts,  real money  supply, public  investment.
Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  Country  intercepts  not reported.
The  Wald test  measures  joint  significance.
Variables: q:  investment  deflator
p:  GDP  deflator
RER:  real  exchange  rate
+:  degrees  of freedom23
the  effects  on investment  due  to  the  combined effects  of changes  in  the
level  of aggregate  demand  and  changes  in  the  expected  cost  of capital. We
also  examine  whether  the  different components of the  cost  of capital  (the
real  interest rate and  the  real price  of  investment goods) affect
investment  differently.  9/  Finally,  we  look  for  any significant  impact  on
private  investment  of foreign  exchange  availability  (measured  as the  sum  of
export  receipts  and  non-monetary  capital  flows)  and  of  public  investment.
As expected,  private  investment  is  positively  related  to real  GDP
growth  and  negatively  related  to the  cost of capital  (table  6).  The  long-
run  elasticity  of the  investment  rate with  respect  to the  cost  of capital
is 0.16  for  manufacturing  exporters  and .12  for  primary  exporters. Foreign
axchange  availability  exerts  a positive,  but  statistically  weak, impact  for
primary  exporters  and  no effect  at all  for  manufacturing  exporters. Public
sector  investment  never  proved to  be  statistically  significant  in  any  of
the  equations.  Our  data  were  unable to  detect any  significant
complementarity  (or  substitutability) between  public  and  private
investment. This may  be  because our  data  did  not  distinguish  between
investment  in infrastructure  and investment  by public  enterprises.
It is  instructive  to  apply  the  estimates in  table  6 to the
investment  and  cost  of capital  figures of table  4 to  calculate  the  portion
of the  decline  in  investment between 1975-82  and  1983-85  accounted  for  by
variations in  the  cost of  capital.  This estimate is  obtained by
multiplying  the  long-run elasticity of  investment  with  respect  to  the
various  components  of the  cost of  capital by  the  change  in  the  average
value  of  these  components between the  two  periods.  The  calculation
indicates  that  only a  fraction of  the  fall in  private  investment  is
attributable  to increases  in  the  cost of capital,  even  for  manufacturing24
Table  6.  Output  and  Substitution  Effects  in Investment
(Dependent  variable: I/Y)
Manufacturing  Exporters  Primary  Exporters
(I/Y)t.i  0.61  0.39
(.11)  (.11)
Costkt-.  -0.06  -0.07
(.026)  (.026)






6  q/p  -1.43  -1.03
(.46)  (.46)
6  (q/p)t-l  --  -1.11
(.53)
Wald  test (X 2)  83.8  84.3
(4)+  (7)+
Sargan  test (X 2)  56.4  33.7
(43)+  (39)+
Test  for  2nd  order
serial  correlation  0.305  0.565
(N(0,1)).
Notes:  Standard  errors  in  parenthesis.  Estimation  Method:  instrumental
variables. The  Wald test  measures  joint  significance.  The  Sargan
test  evaluates  the  accuracy of  the  instrument  set. First-order
serial  correlation  is  introduced  by  taking  first-differences  in
the  original  equation. Country  intercepts  not reported.
Variables:  I/Y:  private  investment/GDP
6:  depreciation  rate  (equal  by assumption
to .07)
Costk: cost  of capital  (real  interest  rate  +  6) q/p
q:  investment  deflator
p:  GDP  deflator
GY:  growth  rate  of  GDP
FXGDP: foreign  exchange  availability/GDP
+:  degrees  of freedom25
exporters,  where  investment  is more  sensitive to  changes  in  the  cost  of
capital. We find  that  34.6  percent  of the  decline  in  private  investment  is
attributable  to increases  in  the  cost of capital. Comparable  figures  for
primary  exporters  are  24.2 percent of  private investment.  We therefore
conclude that the  output  (and cther) effects were  a  more important
contributing  factor  to  the  decline in  investment than  the  substitution
effect.
4.2  Investment  and  the  Debt  Overhang
While  the  accelerator  model  is  useful for  sorting out  the
contribution  of demand  shocks  and  of  changes in the  cost  of capital,  the
calculations  presented  above  suggest  that  other  factors  must  have  played  an
important  role  in  explaining the  recent dramatic decline  in investment
among  developing  countries. To explore  these  other  factors,  we now  turn  to
a  forward-looking  approach  to  the  investment  decision.  Clearly,
entrepreneurs  consider  the  future before  committing  long-term  resources  to
production,  basing  their  decision on  their expectations  about  the  future
path  of the  main determinants  of the  investment's  return.
In a context  where  investment is  at least  partially  irreversible
once  capital  is installed,  the  decision to invest  is intrinsically  tied  to
the  level  of uncertainty  about  the  future  evolution  of the  economy. A high
level  of uncertainty  will  reduce the  propensity to invest  of even  risk-
neutral  entrepreneurs  insofar  as  it  increases  the  possibility  that  highly
productive  capacity  installed  today  will be  of  no use tomorrow  if economic
conditions  deteriorate  sharply.  Under  these  circumstances,  entrepreneurs
would  prefer  to  wait for  the  uncertainty  to dissipate  rather  than  make the
decision  to invest  today.  In  turn,  low  investment  today  increases  the26
probability  of economic  deterioration  tomorrow,  making  the  initial  prophecy
self-fulfilling  (Rodrik 1989).  The  economy becomes trapped in  an
inefficient,  low-investment  equilibrium.
This  outcome  is  not simply  a theoretical  quibble. The scenario  we
have  just sketched matches the  situation in many  developing  countries,
where  the  debt  overhang and  widespread symptoms of adjustment  fatigue
provide  a gloomy  outlook  for  the  recovery  of private  investment.  A recent
World  Bank report  (1988)  concludes that  the  long-run  sustainability  of the
adjustment  effort  is threatened  by  low  investment  rates,  persistent  debt
overhang, worsening  income  distribution,  and  burgeoning fiscal
deficits.  10/  Under  these circumstances,  it  is  no  wonder  that  forward-
looking  entrepreneurs  are  quite  reluctant to  sink  resources  into  nearly
irreversible  activities.
To  model  the  forward-looking  nature  of the  investment  decision,  we
assume that  the  representative  firm is  constrained  by  a  putty-clay
technology  and  operates  in  an  imperfectly  competitive  output  market. (The
model is  derived in  the  appendix.)  The  hypothesis of  a  putty-clay
technology  means  that  production  techniques are  flexible  ex ante  but that
once  chosen,  they  cannot be  changed in  response  to  variations  in factor
prices. Capital market imperfections  are  summarized  by an  agency  cost
function  in  which  a high  leverage is  associated  with  higher  costs  for  the
firm.  Only  debt  and  retained earnings are  available as  sources  of
investment  finance.  Finally, we  dispense with  the  assumption  that  the
interest  rate  and  the  entrepreneur's  discount rate  are identical. Market
imperfections  prevent such equalization.  The  risk premium  (i.e.,  the
difference  between  the  discount  rate  and  the  interest  rate)  is  assumed  to
be a function  of the  macroeconomic  environment.  The  resulting  first-order27
condition  (see  the  appendix) relates the  quasi-forward  difference  in  the
marginal  capital-output  ratio  (multiplied  by the ratio  of the  investment  to
the  output  deflators)  to the  determinants  of the  risk  premium.  ll/
This framework  is  convenient for  investigating  whether  variables
such  as debt ratio,  foreign exchange availability,  the  real  exchange  rate
and  public  investment  have  a significant  bearing  on the  investment  decision
through  their  impact  on the macroeconomic  environment.  Estimation  of the
optimality condition helps  isolate  the  effect of  the macroeconomic
environment  on investment  by  controlling for  the  more  direct  impact  that
these  variables  have on investment  through other  channels  such  as the  cost
of capital.
Wc  estimate this model  for  a  smaller sample that  combines
manufacturing and  primary exporters. 12/  Table  7  indicates  several
important results.  First, an  increase in  the  debt-export ratio  is
associated  with a lower  propensity  to  invest,  possibly  because  of a  higher
risk  premium.  Second a  depreciated real exchange rate and  a greater
availability  of foreign  exchange  both  promote  investment.  Finally,  because
the  impact  of  the  real exchange rate on  total  investment  is  not  very
significant  and  its  inclusion  in  the  equation worsens statistical
performance,  we aiso report an  equation for  total  investment  without  the
real  exchange  rate.
We also investigated  whether the  debt-export ratio  became  more
significant  during  the  crisis  period.  Tests  for  in-sample  stability  show
that  the  debt-export ratio has  a  significantly  higher  coefficient  after
1982 (X 2(2)  =  7.5  and  X2(2) =  20 for  total  and  private  investment).
The  picture that emerges from  these estimates is  that  the
macroeconomic  environment  is likely to  have  had  a significant  impact  on28
Table  7.  Effects  of the  Macroeconomic  Environment  on Investment
(Dependent  variable  is  yt)a/
Private  Total  Total
investment  investment  investment
D/X  1.01  1.34  1.28
(.21)  (.62)  (.43)
D/X (q  IC/p)t  -.74  -. 40  -.42
(.15)  (.28)  (.13)
(q  IC/p)t  2.74  2.17  1.86
(.35)  (.60)  (.27)
RERt-l  -2.56  -2.66  --
(1.07)  (1.91)
RERt_. (q IC/p)t  3.0  2.60  --
(.90)  (.87)
FXt  -1.11  -2.76  -3.06
(.69)  (.84)  (.34)
FXt (q  IC/p)t  -. 10  .11  .19
(.38)  (.34)  (.11)
Wald  test (X 2)  2444  2463  2214
(7)+  (7)+  (5)+
Sargan  test (X 2)  9.1  11.2  13.1
(9)+  (8)+  (8)+
Test foL  2nd  order  serial
correlation  (N(0,1))  .914  -1.74  -. 92
Notes:  Sample  is  all  countries  (manufacturing  and  primary  exporters).
Standard errors are  in  parenthesis.  Country intercepts  not
reported. The  Wald  test measures  joint  significance.  The  Sargan
test  evaluates  the  accuracy of  the  instrument  set. First-order
serial  correlation  is  introduced by  taking  first-differences  in
the  original  equation.
a/  yt =  (q IC/p)t - (1-6) / (1+r)t (q IC/p)t+l
Variables:  q:  investment  deflator; p:  GDP  deflator; r:
real  interest  rate.
IC:  incremental  capital-output  ratio  (=  l/(Qt  -
(1-6)  Qt-l)'  where  Q:  output,  6:  depreciation
rate)
D:  external  debt;  X: export
FX:  foreign  exchange  availability/GDP
RER:  Real  exchange  rate  (defined  as in table  1).
+:  degrees  of freedom29
investment.  The  sample of  20  countries is  smaller  than  one  would  wish
ideally,  and  the  assumption of  continuous optimization  by  agents  is  a
strong  one. Yet  the  results support the  often-heard  contention  that  a
credible  macroeconomic  environment  is  a  prerequisite for  a sustainable
recovery.
Further  support  for  this hypothesis is  given  in  table  8,  which
reports  the results  of regressing  the  fixed country  effects  of table  7  on
the  standard  deviation  of the  real exchange rate,  a.  If fluctuations  in
the  real  exchange  are  a good proxy  for  macroeconomic  instability,  then  the
results  in table  8 confirm  the view that  investment  responds  positively  to
a stable  macroeconomic  environment. 13/  Taken together,  the results  in
tables  7  and  8  suggest that the  state of the  macroeconomic  environment
explains  much of the  cross-country  differences  in investment.
5.  Looking  Ahead
Six  years  into the  crisis that hit developing  countries,  three
facts  stand  out. First, only manufacturing  exporters  have  resumed  growth
to  pre-crisis  levels  and stabilized  their  debt-service  burden. Second,  the
investment  share  in  GDP  has  declined substantially.  Third,  the  real
exchange  rate  has  depreciated sharply, by  about  40 percent  compared  with
its  level  around  1980.  Arguably, a sharp  real  exchange  rate  depreciation
was called  for  by the  need  to service  higher  interest  payments. However,  a
substantial  depreciation  was also clearly at  the  heart  of the  adjustment
with growth  packages  supported  by the  IMF  and  World  Bank.
Complemented  by  microeconomic  reforms  for  rationalizing  incentives
and  by other  measures aimed  at  mobilizing  resources,  depreciation  of the30
Table  8:  Investment  and  Macroeconomic  Stability  a/
±otal  investment  Private  investment
constant  1.69  1.45
(.29)  (.21)
a  b/  -0.30  -0.15
(.12)  (.09)
R2  0.26  0.13
Note:  Estimation  method:  OLS for  20 observations
Standard  errors  are  in  parenthesis
a/  Dependent  variable: fixed-effect  from  table  7
b/  or:  Standard  deviation  of the  real  exchange  rate (RER)31
real  exchange  rate  was  expected  to  help remove  long-standing  distortions  in
factor  markets  that  favoured capital-intensive  projects  and  distortions  in
goods  markets  that  penalized  the  production  of tradables,  notably  exports.
The  evidence  shows that  for most  countries, adjustment  occurred  mainly
through  a reduction  in  expenditures.  To  say  the  least,  the  econometric
evidence  is  certainly consistent  with  structuralist  arguments  that  real
depreciation  elicits  little  supply  response  in  the  short-run.
A  sustainable  recovery  requires  that  income growth exceed
population  growth. For  low  income  countries,  population  growth  is  around  2
percent  a  year.  Per  capita  income  growth  was still  negative  during  1986-88
for  fuel  exporters  and  positive but  less  than  half  a  percent  for  primary
exporters. These  countries  have  not  yet  achieved  sustainable  recovery  in
the  narrow  sense  of a growth  in  per  capita  income  of one  percent  or  more a
year.  Since  adjustment  also  worsened  income  distribution  in  many  countries
because  of the  combination  of  capital flight  and  plummeting  real  wages,  a
sustainable  recovery  has  not  yet  been  achieved.
Yet  there  is evidence  that  sustainable  growth  may be  within  reach
if  productivity-raising  microeconomic  reforms  can  be sustained  long  enough.
This  has  been  clearly  demonstrated  by the  successful  adjustment  experience
of the  East  Asian  countries during the  recent  crisis  and  the  spectacular
increases  in  total factor productivity  growth they achieved during  a
20-year  period  of outward-orientation.  The  calculations  presented  in  this
paper  show  signs,  in  the  form of  a  higher  efficiency  of investment,  that
productivity is  rising.  However, up  to now,  this effect has  been
quantitatively  small. We also  show that only  a small  part  of the  decline
in investment  can  be accounted  for  by the  substitution  effect  arising  from
the  higher  cost  of investment  associated  with  the  sharp  real  exchange  rate32
depreciation.  Therefore we  conclude that,  in  spite  of some  investment
efficiency  improvements,  especially  among manufacturing  exporters,  much  of
the  decline  in  private  investment  miust  be  accounted  for  by factors  other
than  the  cost  of capital.  The  impact of lower  investment  on growth  was
significant.  Indeed,  if one  applies end-of-period  ICORs  to the  estimated
elasticities  of investment  with respect to  the  real  cost  of capital,  one
finds  a yearly  loss  in  growth  of  1.8  percent  for  primary  exporters  and  1.1
percent  for  manufacturing  exporters from the lower  investment  levels  that
is not  caused  by a  higher  cost  of  capital.
The  decline  in  real income caused by the  unfavourable  external
environment also  contributed  to  the  decline in  private investment.
However,  the  evidence  also  supports the  contention that  in  a  world  where
capital  is at  least partially irreversible  once  installed,  uncertainty
about  the  future course of  the  economy will  lead investors  to  wait.
Econometric  evidence  from a  forward-looking  model  of investment  behavior
shows  that  investment  was  negatively related to debt  and  foreign  exchange
availability  indicators.  Therefore, contrary to what  has  often  been
asserted,  debt  relief would  raise investment rather than  consumption.
Evidence  was also  found that  investment  was  negatively  affected  by real
exchange  variability,  a proxy  for  macroeconomic  instability.
Two  lessons  emerge  for  the  design  of  adjustment  programs. In low-
income, primary-exporting countries  the  large  real exchange rate
devaluation  that  is central  to  the  adjustment-with-growth  strategy  may  not
be effective  for  a number  of reasons.  These  include  the  attendant  rise  in
the  cost  of (mostly)  imported  capital  inputs  and the  general  lack  of supply
responsiveness  to  the  real  exchange rate depreciation.  Second,  the
microeconomic  reforms  that  have  been  at the  heart  of  many recent  adjustment33
packages may  not  bear  fruit  if  there  is  uncertainty about  the
sustainability  of the  stabilization  effort.  Investors  will  wait for  the
uncertainty  surrounding  a  stabilization  program to  be resolved,  and low
investment,  in  turn, will  increase the  probability  of future  economic
deterioration.  Under  these circumstances,  there  is  a  high  payoff  for
achieving macroeconomic  stability by  taking appropriate  measures for
partial  debt  relief and  postponing microeconomic  reforms  if  successful
implementation  is  jeopardized  by  the  uncertainty  investors  feel  about  the
economy. At the  same time,  the  use  of funds  available  from  debt  relief
should  be monitored  so  as to improve  the  position  of both  the  creditors  and
the  debtors. As argued  by Sachs  (1989)  and  by Claessens  and  Diwan (1990),
debt relief  should  come  with  enhanced  conditionality  to  provide  the  country
with the  incentive  to  adjust and, perhaps more  crucially,  to  avoid  the
resumption  of unsustainable  macroeconomic  policies.34
Footnotes
1/  The growth rate  of  the  debt-export  ratio,  d,  is  related to the
nominal interest rate, i, and  the  growth rate of the nominal export
revenue (in dollars), x, by the expression d =  i - x +  V/D where V is
thl non-interest current account deficit and D is debt in dollars.
2/  See Edwards (1989b),  and World Bank  (1988) for a description of IMF-
World Bank supported adjustment packages.
3/  Lizondo and  Montiel  (1989)  give  an  exhaustive  discussion of the
various  factors  contributing  to  the  contractionary  effects  of
devaluation.  Also see Edwards (1989a,  chapter 8).
4/  Real exchange rate depreciation  was  even stronger for recipients of
World Bank-IMF  adjustment  loans.  Thirty  countries  that did not
receive  adjustment  loans  with  a  major  trade  reform  component
depreciated in real terms by  less  than 2 percent between 1980-2 and
1985-7,  whereas  40  countries  that  received  structural adjustment
loans depreciated by 22  percent  in  real  terms.  (See  World Bank,
1988).
5/  In tie augmented  model, the coefficients  for RER for the two periods
are (t-values  in parentheses):  0.32  (3.19);  -0.33 (-2.53).  We also
obtained a statistically significant  value  for the absorption dummy
for the manufacturing-exporter category.  That result, -0.07 (-0.99);
0.006 (3.22), is  consistent  with  a  regime  switch, in  which these
countries passed to a binding external constraint starting in 1982.
6/  For example, Pritchett (1990)  finds  a  weak relationship  between the
merchandise  trade  balance  and  the  real  exchange  rate,  after
controlling for  terms-of-trade  improvements.  His rationalization,35
likely  to apply  for  the  1980s, is  that even  though  exports  may
respond to  variation in  the  real exchange rate,  imports are
determined  by foreign  -exchange availability (i.e. by exports)  and
hence  may  move  perversely.
7/  For  a  sample of  14  countries, the  loss  of  productive  capacity
attributable to  this  fall in  investment  has  been  estimated  to
approach,  on average,  12  of  their GDP  each  year  during  82-86  (Faini
et al.  88).
8/  Because  of the  impossibility  of distinguishing  between  the  public  and
private  sector  components  of  GDP in  our  sample,  the  ICOR  calculations
in  table  4 are  at  best  suggestive  of  trends  in the  efficiency  of
investment.  Also,  these rough  calculations  do  not  account  for
changes  in  capacity  utilization.  For  alternative  calculations  that
indicate  an increase  in  the  efficiency  of investment  during  the  1980s
see  Easterly  and  Wetzel  (1989).
9/  We also tested  for  a  separate and/or different  effect  of the real
exchange  rate  but  found  none.
10/  See  V. Thomas  et  al.  (1990) for  a  more  complete  appraisal  of the
sustainability  of  adjustment programs  based  on  a  case-by-case
approach.
11/  The  main shortcoming  of this approach is that  it  assumes  continuous
optimization.  Alternative  approaches that  stress  the  importance  of
financial  variables on  investment (e.g., Fazzari et  al. (1988),
Dailami  (1990)  would  require  data  that  preclude  their  application  to
a large  sample  of countries.
12/  The  sample  is  the same as  that in tables  4-6  except  that  countries
with  negative  ICORs  have  been  eliminated.36
13/  Alesina  and  Tabellini (1989) analyze the  effects  of  macroeconomic
instability  in terms  of  political  decisions.37
References
Alesina,  A. and  G. Tabellini (1989).  "External  Debt,  Capital  Flight  and
Political  Risk,"  Journal  of International  Economics.
Anderson,  T. and  C. Hsiao  (1982).  "Formulation  and  Estimation  of  Dynamic
Models  Using  Panel  Data,"  Journal  of  Econcmetrics.
Arellano,  M. and  S. Bond  (1988).  "Some Test  of Specification  for  Panel
Data: Montecarlo Evidence and  an  Application  to an Employment
Equation,"  IFS  Discussion  paper  88/4.
Arellano,  M. and  S.  Bond  (1988).  "Dynamic Panel  Data  Estimation  Using
DPD,"  IFS  Discussion  paper  88/10.
Blejer,  M. and  M. Khan  (1984).  "Government  Policy  and  Private  Invest%tent
in  Developing  Countries",  IMF  Staff  Papers.
Buffie,  E. (1984).  "The Macroeconomics  of Trade  Liberalization,"  Journal
of International  Economics.
Buffie,  E.  (1986).  "Devaluation,  Investment and  Growth," Journal  of
Development  Economics.
Bruno,  M. (1979). "Stabilization  and  Stagflation  in a Semi-Industrialized
Economy,"  in  R.  Dornbusch and  J.  Frenkel,  eds.,  International
Economic  Policy:  Theory and  Evidence.  Johns  Hopkins  University
Press,  Baltimore.
Cavallo,  D. (1977).  "Stagflationary  Effects  of  Monetarist  Stabilization
Policies,"  Ph.D  Thesis,  Harvard  University.
Chenery,  H. (1975).  "The Structuralist  Approach  to  Development  Policy,"
American  Economic  Review.
Chenery,  H.,  S. Robinson,  and  M.  Syrquin. (1986). Industrialization  and
Growth,  Oxford  University  Press: Oxford.
Claessens,  S.  and  I.  Diwan.  (1990).  "Liquidity,  Debt Relief,  and
Conditionality"  in I.  Husain  and  I.  Diwan  eds.  Dealing  with  the
Debt  Crisis. Washington,  D.C.,  The  World  Bank.
Corbo,  V.,  M. Goldstein,  M.  Khan,  eds. (1987). Growth-Oriented  Adjustment
Programs. World  Bank: Washington,  D.C.
Dailami, M.  (1990).  "Financial  Policy and  Corporate Investment in
Imperfect  Capital  Markets:  Evidence from Korea,"  mimeo,  World
Bank,  Washington,  D.C.
Dell,  S. (1982). "Stabilization:  The  Political  Economy  of  Overkill,"  World
Development.38
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1980).  "Southern  Cone  Stabilization  Plans," in W.
Cline and Veintraub, eds.,  Stabilization in Developing Countries.
Brookings Institution,  Washington, D.C.
Dornbusch, R. (1988).  "Notes  on Credibility and Stabilization," (mimeo),
MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Easterly, W. and D. Wetzel (1989).  "Policy  Determinants of Growth:  Survey
of Theory and Evidence," PPR Discussion Paper No.  313,  World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Edwards, S. (1989a).  Real  Exchange  Rates,  Devaluation and Adjustment:
Exchange  Rate  Policy  in  Developing  Countries,  MIT  Press,
Cambridge.
Edwards, S. (1989b).  "The  International  Monetary Fund and the Developing
Countries:  A  Critical  Evaluation"  Carnegie Rochester Conference
Series on Public Policy.
Faini, R.,  J.  de  Melo,  A.  Senhadji-Semlali,  and  J.  Stanton, (1990).
'Growth-Oriented  Adjustment  Programs:  A Statistical Analysis,"
PRE  Discussion  Paper  No.  426,  World  Bank,  Washington, D.C.,
forthcoming  World Development.
Fazzari, S.,  G. Hubbard and B. Petersen (19d8).  "Financing  Constraints and
Corporate Investment."  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity.
Krugman,  P.  and  L.  Taylor.  (1977).  "Contractionary  Effects  of
Devaluation," Journal of International  Economics.
Lizondo, S.  and  P.  Montiel  (1989).  "Contractionary  Devaluation:  An
Analytical Overview," IMF Staff Papers.
Nickell, S.  (1979).  The  Investment  Decision  of  the Firm.  Cambridge
University Press.
Pritchett, L. (1990).  "The  Merchandise Trade Balance and the Real Exchange
Rate  in  LDCs"  Country  Economics  Department,  The  World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Rodrik,  D.  (1989).  "Policy  Uncertainty  and  Private  Investment  in
Developing  Countries,"  NBER  Working  Paper  No.  2999, National
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,  Mass..
Sachs, J. (1989).  "The  Debt  Overhang  of  Developing Countries," in G.
Calvo,  R.  Findlay,  P.  Kouri  and  J.  de  Macedo,  eds., Debt,
Stabilization and Development:  Essays  in Memory of Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
Taylor, L. (1982).  Structuralist  Macroeconomics.  Basic Books.
Thomas, V.,  A.  Chhibber,  M.  Dailami,  and  J.  de  Melo,  eds., (1980).
Structural Adj stment  and  the  World  Bank.  Oxford University
Press, Oxford (forthcoming).39
Van  Wijnbergen,  S.  (1986).  "Exchange Rate  Management  and  Stabilization
Policies in  Developing  Countries,"  Journal of  Development
Economics.
World  Bank (1988). 'Adjustment  Lending:  An  Evaluaticn  of Ten  Years  of
Experience," Policy and  Research Series No.  1,  World  Bank,
Washington,  D.C.40
Appendix
This  appendix  describes  the  data  used  for  the  investment  equations
and the  model  used  in the  results  reported  in  table  7.
The  Investment  Equations
Data.  The  data  for  the  investment  equations  were  collected  from
internal  World  Bank  reports on  individual countries.  The  sample  was
determined  by the  availability  of a  time  series  of about  10  years  or more
in  which  total  gross  investment  was  broken  down  into  its  private  and  public
sector  components.  Often, investment in  public sector  enterprises  was
either unavailable separately or  was  included with  private sector
investment.  Consistency  of treatment  was ensured  within  each  country  and,
whenever  possible,  investment  by  public sector enterprises  was included
with public  sector investment.  Private investment  was obtained  as the
difference  between  total  gross  domestic fixed  investment  and  the  collected
public  sector  investment  series.  The  resulting  sample  of 33  countries  is
described  in  table  Al.
The  Model. The  representative  firm is assumed  to  be constrained
by a  putty-clay  technology and  to  operate in an imperfectly  competitive
output  market. Imperfections  in  capital markets  constrain  the  financing
choice  of the  firm. There  is  no  well-functioning  stock  market. There  are,
as a result,  only  two  sources of  finance: (short-term)  debt  and retained
earnings. Entrepreneurs  discount future returns at  a rate,  i,  which is
assumed  to be larger  than the  risk-free  interest  rate,  r (otherwise  firms
would  accumulate  financial assets).  Therefore, debt  is  the  privileged41
source  of  finance (perhaps  also  because of  its  favored tax  status).
However,  an internal  solution  to  the  optimal  debt  decision  is  obtained  by
assuming  that  higher  outstanding  debt  relative to  the  firm's  capital  is
associated  with increasing  agency  costs.
The  firm's  problems  can  be  written  as:
(A4)  max E  ()  [Pt(Qt)  Qt - wt Nt - qt It +  Bt  t-1
- rBt-  A  [Bt,  Pt(*) Qt)
s.t.
t  ~~v-  t
(A5)  Qt  =  E  (1-6)  I f(k  )/k
v=t-L  V  v  v
t  v-t
(A6)  N  =  E  ( 1-6 )  Il/k
v=t-L 
where  Qt,  Nt,  and  It  represent output, employment and  investment,
respectively,  pt(Qt)  is  the  inverse demand function, and wt and  qt are
labor  and  investment  costs,  respectively.  On the  financial  side,  rt is the
risk-free  interest  rate  and  A(Bt,  P(o)  Qt)  with  A1 >  0,  A2 <  0 and  All >  0
is the  agency  cost function. Equations  (A5)  and (A6)  define  the  production
and  the  labor  demand  function  for  a  putty-clay  technology,  where  L is  the
average  life  of capital  goods,  6  denotes  their  depreciation  rate,  and f(kv)
and  kv represent  the  ex  ante production function  (in  intensive  form)  and
the  capital  labour  ratio.
The  first-order  conditions  for  output  and  debt  are:42
- 1-6-MA
(A7)  g (qt'  wt)  - +1 g (qt+l'  wt+)  =  t - MRtA2
(A8)  (1+i) (1-Al)  - (l+r)  =  0
where MRt denotes marginal revenue  and  g(  ) is an increasing function of
factor  prices  (Nickell 1979).  The  function g  represents  the  present
discounted  value  over  a  lifetime of  marginal  costs  of installed  capacity
for  a  machine  after  allowing  for  depreciation. At an optimum,  the  cost  of
an extra  unit  of capacity today  is  equated to  marginal  revenue  plus the
discounted  saving  of not  having  to  install more capacity  tomorrow. The
variable  w represents  the  present  discounted value  of labor  costs  over the
lifetime  of a  machine. Even  after  parameterizing  the  agency  cost  fur.ction
and  the  ex ante  production function, one  cannot  estimate  (A7)  since  w is
not  observable.  We can,  however,  substitute out  for  w by  using  the  first-
order  condition  for  kv  (not reported in  the  text), which  relates  the
marginal  rate  of substitution  between labor  and  capital in the  ex ante
production  function  to  qt/wt. We find  that  g( )  =  qt/f'  (kt).
For  the  purpose of  estimation,  we  assume that  f(kt)  is  Cobb-
Douglas  and  A ( )  is  quadratic,  i.e.:
(2
(A9)  A(B  p  Q)=aI2(  t  - C)p  Q t  t  p  Q )2 t t43
Substitution  and  manipulations  yield:
(Al)  Pt  It  1 6  qt+l It+l  = (e1)  a  [1/2a (i-r)  2/(l+i)  2+ 1 +  ac/2],
where  XCt  denotes the  incremental  capital-output  ratio, ir is the  real
interest  rate,  [l+ir =  (1+i)pt/pt+i]  and  e  and  a  represent  the  price
elasticity  of demand  and  the  capital elasticity  of output,  respectively.
The  right-hand  side  of (A.7)  is  equal  to  MRt (1-A 2) after  substituting  from
(A.5)  and (A.6)  and  multiplying  by  a/pt.  To interpret  the  left-hand  side
of eq. (AlO)  notice  that  a  large value  of IC indicates  a relatively  more
capital-intensive  technique  on the  latest vintage which  in turn must  be
attributed,  for  a given  q, to a relatively  high  level of  w, i.e.  of  the
present  discounted  value  of labour  costs  over  the  lifetime  of  machine. As
a result  the  present value  of  marginal costs associated  with a  machine
(i.e.  the  function  g (.))  will be  also large  and  lead,  as indicated  by eq.
(A7),  to a lower  capacity  output.  For  a  given  value  of 6, (AMO)  can  be
estimated  if  we assume  that  izr.  Suppose though  that  1+i  =  (l+r)  (l+p),
where  p is  a  multiplicative  risk premium  that  depends  on the  macroeconomic
environment.  Multiply  (AlO)  by  l+p  and  bring  the  unobservable  terms  from
the  left  side  to the  right  side of  (Al).  We then  assume  that  p can  be
expressed as  a  function proxy  of  the  state of  the macroeconomic
environment.
Equation  (AlO)  provides  the  basis  for  estimation.  We apply (AlO)
to the  panel  described  above.  In  estimating  equation  (AlO),  we experiment
over  different  values  of  6.  Notice that  if  p is  not equal  to zero,  then44
the  lagged value  of  q(IC/p) should belong on  the  right  side  of the
equation.  Fixed-effect estimation  under  these  circumstances  would  be
problematic, insofar as  in  dynamic panel  data models  the  speed of
convergence  is  a function  of  the number of observations  per  country. To
circumvent  this  problem, we  rely  on  a  modified Anderson-Hsiao  (1982)
procedure. To eliminate  the  fixed  effect,  we take  first  differences  of the
original  equation. By  doing  so, however, the  error  term,  if it  was  white
noise  to  begin  with,  is  transformed  into a first-order  unit-root  moving
average  process  which  is  correlated  with  the  first  difference  of q(IC/p).
Therefore, we  use  an  (efficient)  instrumental  variable procedure by
exploiting  all  the  orthogonality  restrictions  between  the  error  term  and (q
IC/p)t_i  where  i >  1.  This generalized  method  of  moment  estimator  was
implemented  in the  DPD  program  developed  by Arellano  and  Bond (1988).PRE  Working  Paper  Seriee
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